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Abstract: 
 
My goal in this chapter is to show how a focus on everyday practices, including discourse, 
allows us to understand the interpenetration of individual and social in the course of human 
development. A practice-based approach does not seek to explain development by reference only 
to individual factors, without simultaneous consideration of the social context within which the 
individual is acting, or to social factors, without examining the ways in which the social world is 
experienced differently by the different individuals inhabiting it. Such an approach is in keeping 
with the ideas of Vygotsky and Piaget, both of whom (albeit in different ways) eschewed the 
dichotomy of individual and social (Smith, 1996; Tudge & Scrimsher, 2003; Tudge & 
Winterhoff, 1993). The difficulties inherent in this more systemic approach, however, stem from 
the fact that most scholars interested in development have not been trained to think systemically 
but rather in terms of causal models inspired by the positivist tradition (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
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Article: 
 
My goal in this chapter is to show how a focus on everyday practices, including discourse, 
allows us to understand the interpenetration of individual and social in the course of human 
development. A practice-based approach does not seek to explain development by reference only 
to individual factors, without simultaneous consideration of the social context within which the 
individual is acting, or to social factors, without examining the ways in which the social world is 
experienced differently by the different individuals inhabiting it. Such an approach is in keeping 
with the ideas of Vygotsky and Piaget, both of whom (albeit in different ways) eschewed the 
dichotomy of individual and social (Smith, 1996; Tudge & Scrimsher, 2003; Tudge & 
Winterhoff, 1993). The difficulties inherent in this more systemic approach, however, stem from 
the fact that most scholars interested in development have not been trained to think systemically 
but rather in terms of causal models inspired by the positivist tradition (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
 
I would like initially to illustrate the issue by referring to Roger Säljö’s recent article (2000), 
based on his presentation at the 1997 Johann Jacobs Foundation conference on social interaction. 
The session in which Säljö’s talk took place appeared under the heading “How Knowledge Is 
Transmitted....” In his article, Säljö rejected the use of this implicitly unidirectional formulation 
that has knowledge being transmitted from one (presumably more competent) individual or 
group to a (presumably less competent) receiver. Instead, he spoke about appropriation, a term 
that necessarily involves active participation by the learner. That change in terminology was 
helpful, given that Säljö’s aim was to lead us toward an understanding of understanding that is 
not an individual construct but instead is rooted in social and discursive practices (see also Säljö, 
1999). 
 
His argument drew on sociocultural and discourse theory and the work of others in the 
sociocultural tradition to show that “psychological functioning [is] situationally intimately 
intertwined with social interaction” (2000, p. 35). Rather than thinking in terms of individual 
competencies (someone “possesses” some cognitive attribute or some knowledge of a concept), 
Säljö (2000) argued that learning is primarily about how individuals come to appropriate and use 
concepts in specific situations (discursive practices). Säljö placed himself squarely in opposition 
to a mentalist view of concepts that has them “residing inside individuals as abstract copies of an 
outside reality” (2000, pp. 36–37). Säljö’s position was that one understands something in a 
specific context with no guarantee that the same understanding will be in evidence once the 
context is changed or the thing to be understood is in any way different. This is something that 
traditional cognitive researchers have had difficulty with for years, the problem of transfer, 
which is a problem only if we take an approach that has the individual owning some competence. 
 
To this point, Säljö’s (2000) argument was clearly in accord with the systemic perspective 
mentioned earlier. However, he also used wording that implied a more dualistic position and 
took an almost socially deterministic position, arguing that meaning is “to a significant extent 
determined by factors that lie outside the mental apparatus of the student” (2000, p. 35). If one 
takes seriously the position that knowledge does not lie within the skull of the individual but in 
the spaces between individual and other, it makes little sense to speak of inside the head and 
outside; it is while engaging in some practice or activity (being in a social situation) that one is 
able to succeed at some task (perhaps with help) or to show understanding of some concept, with 
no guarantee that one will be able to have the same success or understanding in a different 
context. 
 
Elsewhere in the article, by contrast, Säljö seemed to want to retain the view that an individual 
possesses knowledge or competence. His statement that “Even a student sitting [alone with a 
book] cannot be conceived as involved in an activity that is entirely private and internal” (2000, 
p. 35) seems to suggest that the activity is somewhat private and internal, rather than being 
necessarily social, simply because the activity involves at least one social other (the author of the 
text). Säljö also stated: “The assumption that knowledge forms part of discourses leads to the 
scrutiny not only of individual competencies but also to an interest in the concrete conditions 
under which people act, and the constraints and affordances that are built into these situations” 
(2000, p. 38; emphasis added). 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that this apparently dualist position (emphasizing at one time social 
determinants of cognition and at another time individual competencies) appeared in an article 
that sought to take a constitutive approach to cognition. The relations between individual and 
social are complex, and even among those who take what has been termed a socio-genetic 
perspective, there is debate about whether the epistemic individual, the active, thinking, planning 
individual, exists at all. Lightfoot and Cox (1997), reviewing recent writing on this topic, 
distinguished between different ways of conceptualizing the boundaries between self and other: 
 
By one version, the child is understood to be part of a larger social or cultural whole; by 
the other, the child is seen as an ensemble of social relations. The first of these 
encourages a dissolution of boundaries, whereas the other insists on their centrality. (p. 7) 
 
My view is that we do not want to lose sight of the individual, with his or her unique 
perspectives; but at the same time, we must acknowledge that individuals are socially created. 
We are all well aware of our own particular ways of making sense of the world. These ways are 
unique to us, our personal culture in Valsiner’s (1989) term. As I have written elsewhere (Tudge, 
1997), in one sense it is clear that I am writing this chapter (no one else has ever written exactly 
what appears before you) and that the ideas being expressed “are at one and the same time my 
own and a social product – the ideas of others, half-forgotten, combined, transformed, and 
reconstructed in their own peculiar way by me” (p. 129).Moreover, they are ideas that were 
highly influenced by Säljö’s (2000) article or at least my interpretation of it. The trick is to 
understand that these ideas are at one and the same time individual and social, an 
interpenetration of individual and social, which is essentially the argument that Säljö is making. 
As Säljö expressed it: 
 
I will not . . . regard understanding as an internal . . . psychological quality characteristic 
of a particular class of experiences. Even though I myself truly enjoy the feeling of 
understanding, I will consider the psychological dimension as a derivative of my 
participation in collective social practices. (2000, p. 36) 
 
Does this mean, echoing Packer (1993), that, although individuals are social in origin, they are 
independent, autonomous beings as a result of their prior social experiences? I think not, for with 
every engagement in any practice (including reading a book in solitude or thinking), the 
individual is actively playing a part in a social world. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I present some of the ways in which I would take Säljö’s (2000) 
argument a little further, first placing his article into a broader metatheoretical framework and, 
second, moving away from a focus on discourse to activities more generally. 
 
As Winegar (1997) has argued, it is helpful to place the theories that we find useful into their 
broader metatheoretical framework. As Säljö (2000) has pointed out, there is a crucial distinction 
between idealist and realist positions, on the one hand, and situated practices, on the other. The 
distinction is, I think, redolent of a broader shift that has been taking place in developmental 
psychology over the past few years, away from an individualistic and unidirectional approach to 
developmental issues. Increasingly, scholars are taking an approach to development that is more 
systemic, co-constructive, and dialectical, an approach that stresses the interrelatedness of social 
and individual aspects of development. This approach is by no means new; echoes are found in 
the writings of Baldwin, Dewey, Janet, Lewin, Mead, Piaget, Vygotsky, and others writing a 
century ago and into the 1930s (Cole & Engeström, 1993; Tudge, Gray, & Hogan, 1997; Van der 
Veer & Valsiner, 1991). The ideas may not be new, but perhaps the time is right for them to be 
taken seriously. 
 
This is the argument that has been made by Guba and Lincoln (1994) in their discussion of 
competing metatheoretical paradigms. They contrasted positivist and postpositivist paradigms 
with the postmodern paradigms of critical theory and constructivism. Distinctions between them 
can be drawn in terms of ontology (the form and nature of reality), epistemology (the relation 
between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known), and methodology. The first 
two paradigms can be characterized by their essentially realist (naive or critical) ontological 
position, whereas the two postmodern paradigms may be characterized by a view of reality that 
is shaped both historically and at the local situated level. In terms of epistemology, the positivist 
and postpositivist positions reflect a dualist position in which the investigator and “subject” 
are separable entities, although this separation may be obtainable only through strict 
experimental control. By contrast, proponents of the postmodern paradigms argue that the 
relation is transactional, with no separation between investigator and participant in the study. As 
might be expected from these epistemological stances, positivist methodology relies on 
experimental and manipulative methods, whereas postmodern methodology involves dialogue 
and a dialectical stance (at least if the methodology is related to the underlying theoretical 
assumptions, something that is not always the case). 
 
Another way in which it is possible to take Säljö’s (2000) argument a little further is to place his 
ideas in the broader context of situated practice rather than simply in that of discourse, which, in 
Säljö’s article, was involved in the process of trying to find out what someone knows in the 
course of interviews. This is not to argue that discourse is unimportant – far from it – but rather 
to point out that this type of interview may be an unusual type of practice in which to engage. As 
Säljö pointed out, children who are perfectly well aware of the number of days they go to school 
in a week can still be fooled by the nature and context of a question about days in a week. 
Similarly (using another example that Säljö incorporated into his paper), ice hockey players 
know precisely how hard to hit the puck to ensure that it begins to slow down before officials 
halt play for icing, and yet they may have great difficulty with a question that requires thinking 
about force and friction. Their understanding of these concepts may thus be more related to their 
everyday use of skills in one context (a specific type of practice) than to discourse. What may be 
more beneficial than interviewing participants in our studies about some concept or activity 
would be observing them and having them talk about the same things in the context of the 
relevant activity itself. Of course, this involves far more trouble for psychologists, which is why 
so many choose to engage in lab research or to interview in a context far removed from the 
setting in which the relevant activity typically takes place. Ethnographic studies of discourse, or 
of language development, allow us to see the ways in which children come to appropriate the 
concepts that are relevant in their cultural groups in the course of engaging in relevant activities 
and participating in discourse (see, e.g., Goodwin, 1990; Heath, 1983; Ochs, 1988; Schieffelin, 
1990). Greater familiarity with and exposure to concepts or skills in a variety of contexts and 
practices may help children to appropriate them, to make them “their own” in the sense that they 
are able to show their understanding of the concept or their competent, skillful performance in a 
variety of different contexts (see also the study by Schoultz, Säljö, & Wyndhamn, 2001, of how 
children required to use an artifact, a globe, can successfully master conceptual structures that 
they otherwise could not). This does not imply, of course, that there will be no contexts in which 
the child fails to show understanding. 
 
In fact, if we are truly interested in understanding the process of understanding, maybe we 
should move beyond situated discourse and focus instead on practices, practices that often 
feature language (interpersonal or intrapersonal). The work of Jean Lave (1988; Lave & Wenger, 
1991) illustrates nicely the interpenetration of individual and social in the context of engaging in 
everyday activities, as does the research of those who have examined the ways in which 
mathematics is learned in school and on the streets (Nunes, Schliemann, & Carraher, 1993; Saxe, 
1991) and the work of Cole and his colleagues in the area of reading (Cole & Engeström, 1993). 
 
Other authors in this volume make very similar arguments about the necessity to study activities. 
Not surprisingly, given her earlier work (e.g., Heath, 1983), Shirley Brice Heath (this volume) is 
particularly interested in analyzing the discourse of the adolescents who participated in the 
youth-based organizations that she has studied. As one of her informants pointed out, however, 
“When you do something where you create, it builds something inside you that never really goes 
away” (p. 49). Analysis of discourse may well be an effective way to understand how 
adolescents become drawn into, change, and are changed by an activity, but it is by engaging in 
that activity (not simply by talking about such engagement) that one changes and is most 
changed. Discourse is relevant to change, of course, and Heath provides nice examples of the 
ways in which her adolescent participants use language to help refine their understandings of the 
rules of the organization, the roles that they are learning to fulfill, and so on. Nonetheless, 
participation in the activities in every way, including linguistically, is key. Discourse without 
practice would signify little. 
 
Karsten Hundeide’s work (this volume) dealing with counterculture youth movements, rather 
than with the more socially acceptable groups that Heath studies, illustrates the same basic point: 
that discourse is but one aspect of a broader range of activities in which people engage in the 
process of becoming a part of the group. Hundeide discusses the roles played by actions that 
“express and confirm the recruit’s status as an insider and often conflict with one’s previous 
values. These actions may involve taking some drug, participating in some criminal action 
against the recruit’s previous code of morality, or simply taking on the style and extreme uniform 
of a youth movement and thus appearing in public with the other participants.” 
 
My own recent research (Tudge, Hogan,& Etz, 1999a; Tudge et al., 1999b; Tudge & Putnam, 
1997) is also focused on the ways in which individuals appropriate an understanding of their 
culture’s concepts, skills, and practices in the course of participating in their everyday activities. 
This work does not relate to adolescents but rather to young children as they move from the 
preschool years and enter formal schooling. The points that I wish to make are generally 
applicable, however, and not relevant only to young children’s development. 
 
I would argue that the best way in which to understand this process is to observe it in action, 
focusing on the types of commonplace activities in which people often engage. I illustrate this 
with some details from my research. My colleagues and I have collected a great deal of 
observational data (20 hours per child, spread over the course of 1week in order to encompass a 
complete waking day) on preschoolers in a single medium-sized city in each of various 
countries, including the United States, Russia, Estonia, Finland, Korea, and Kenya. The children 
were observed wherever they were situated: at home, with friends or relatives, in a preschool 
center, and so on. We focused on the activities going on around the children (those that were 
potentially available to them), the activities in which the children engaged, how those activities 
started and how the children became involved, partners in those activities, and the roles taken by 
participants in the activities in which the children were involved. Those who were around the 
children (i.e., teachers, parents, friends, and others who played important roles in their lives) 
made activities available to their children in various ways. They engaged in those activities 
themselves (e.g., cleaning house, watching television, reading a newspaper, playing) and 
encouraged or discouraged their children from engaging in those activities. They made available 
to their children objects that they wished their children to engage with (e.g., books, television, 
toys, at least in industrialized, wealthy societies) and talked to their children about things they 
deemed interesting and important. At the same time, the children themselves were actively 
involved in the process of participation in the activities that were available, trying to engage in 
some activities that those around tried to discourage them from, and initiating new activities and 
trying to recruit others to join in with them. 
 
Because the project is designed to be longitudinal, with data collected again once the children 
have entered school, our first publications have focused on those activities that may be most 
apropos to school-related competencies. These activities are lessons that relate to literacy or 
numeracy (academic lessons); lessons about how to do things or about the workings of the 
natural world (skill/nature lessons); looking at a book or using school-relevant materials, but 
without an explicit lesson being involved (play with academic objects); and being involved in 
conversation with one or more adults (conversation). In each of the cities, children whose parents 
are well educated by the standards of the society and whose occupations are professional (i.e., 
middle class) engage more in these types of activities than do children whose parents do not have 
higher education and whose jobs are not professional (i.e., working class). It could be that the 
reason for this differential involvement is simply that the middle-class parents think that it is 
more important for their children to engage in these activities than do working-class parents. If 
this is so, the former make such activities more available to their children (a unidirectional, 
culturally transmitted view of the process of development). It is particularly striking, however, 
that at least some differences in engagement between middle-class and working-class children 
result from the former being more likely to initiate those activities themselves. In other words, 
the children actively involve themselves in activities that those around them deem important. 
 
What are some of the consequences of inhabiting social systems that encourage different types of 
activities? I am trying to argue not that, by engaging in lessons or talking with adults, children 
simply learn more, but that they come to understand that these activities are considered important 
by significant others in their lives. They come to have meaning beyond the specific lesson that is 
or is not being learned in the course of interaction. What is being appropriated by the children is 
revealed in their willingness to initiate similar types of experiences, asking questions, or trying to 
engage adults in conversation. To put this in clearer focus, it is worthwhile to look at a different 
type of lesson that we coded: interpersonal lessons, or lessons about how to behave well with 
others. Our U.S. data show that middle-class children (particularly boys) engaged in more 
academic lessons, whereas working-class children (particularly girls) engaged in more 
interpersonal lessons. When looking at these gender differences, the inferences that can be drawn 
are striking: Middle-class boys inhabit a social world in which things academic are viewed as 
important (by adults and children alike), whereas working-class girls are learning that what is 
important is knowing how to behave appropriately with others. Subsequent encounters with the 
social world are then influenced by what these children have come to see as appropriate and what 
they have made their own through their earlier participation in practices with others. 
 
In some sense, of course, this is the essence of the sociocultural approach: to show that, through 
engagement in activities, children come to be drawn into the social world and to learn, through 
participation with others who are more competent, the skills and concepts deemed relevant and 
important in that culture. However, this point is complicated by the fact that cultures are not 
homogeneous entities. It is one thing to argue that different cultural groups value different 
competencies, whether for all children or further differentiated for boys and girls within the 
group. But the situation is more complex when the cultural groups can be thought of as 
subcultures within a larger culture. In such a case, one subculture’s competencies may well 
occupy a more privileged position than do others. For example, in the United States at present, 
academic competence is valued more highly than interpersonal competence. What are the long-
term consequences of engaging in and initiating these types of academically relevant activities, 
as opposed to spending more time learning interpersonal lessons? The data suggest (Tudge, 
Odero, Hogan, & Etz, 2003) that there is a moderate relation between these types of 
academically related activities and teachers’ perceptions of their academic competence 
approximately 4 years later, when the children are ages 7 and 8, both in terms of initiation of 
these activities (r = .24) and for engagement in them (r = .40). It is necessary to point out that 
these children are for the most part in different schools and have different teachers, so the 
teachers are not comparing middle-class and working-class children within the same classroom. 
The story is thus more complex than simply that middle-class children in the United States 
engage in more of these activities and are viewed as more academically competent by their 
teachers than are working-class children. 
 
At this point, it may seem that I have focused too much on practice in general and excluded 
discourse as one example of practice. There is more of a connection, however, than might be 
apparent. Of the four activities (academic lessons, skill/nature lessons, play with academic 
objects, and conversation with adults) that I have discussed so far, one was far more related to 
teachers’ perceptions of academic competence than were the others: namely, conversation with 
one or more adults. The correlation between preschoolers’ initiation of conversation with an 
adult and perceived competence 4 years later at school was a remarkable .67, and engagement in 
conversation was also highly correlated (r = .59).Moreover, the one activity that was not at all 
predictive of later academic competence was play with academic objects. Of the four activities of 
interest, this was the only one that did not necessarily involve some discourse. It is thus apparent 
that, through participation with others in everyday activities (particularly discursive activities), 
individuals come to be perceived as competent. Those perceived to be more competent in any 
domain are likely to be treated differently (often better) from those perceived to be less 
competent, thereby continuing to illustrate the interrelations of psychological functioning and 
social interaction, as Säljö (2000) argued in his article. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that these processes are by no means limited to children’s development. 
Adolescents and adults, like children, engage in myriad activities in which discourse may play a 
large role, a small role, or no role at all. By engaging in activities, often in conjunction with 
others, we all (no matter what age) become more competent at those activities. We do so 
sometimes because we engage with others who are more competent. Examples include children 
engaging with an adult in work or play, as well as adolescents becoming involved in a youth 
organization with others who are already members. However, we also become more competent 
as we engage with others who are less competent; for example, professors often understand 
concepts at a higher level after teaching them to students. It would thus be a mistake to think that 
such interactions are simply scaffolding, or a more competent partner providing the necessary 
assistance to enable the less competent partner to learn or become more skilled. The process is 
dynamic and dialectical, not unidirectional. What is done and said by any one person in any 
interaction depends in part on what the other is doing and saying. What each of the participants 
appropriates from the interaction is different, because the sense or meaning of the interaction is 
different for each and is understood differently because of prior experiences and understandings. 
As teachers, we know that, no matter what concept we try to “transmit,” we can guarantee that 
there will be as many new understandings as there are students, each of whom will transform 
what is said in light of his or her previous understanding of the concept. There can thus be no 
simple transmission from one to the other: Instead there is a transactional relationship in which 
what each appropriates from the interaction is socially constructed and individually transformed. 
 
The more that individuals engage in different practices, discursive or otherwise, with different 
people in different settings, the more they come to be seen as being competent at those practices. 
Indeed, we may consider people to be competent or to have understanding when they can display 
it in a variety of settings rather than in just one specific setting. Competence or understanding is 
then deemed an individual attribute: What has been appropriated from multiple engagements in 
practice is part of the individual’s personal culture and will be part of what the individual brings 
to subsequent encounters with the social world. Competence or understanding is thus 
simultaneously entirely individual and entirely social. 
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